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Abstract 
This paper begins by painting the socio-political and economic map of Indian democracy in 2008. Accordingly, the 
paper posits six basic positions and six argumentative premises. Cataloguing a series of economic issues the paper 
clearly states that the twin evils of uneven distribution of income, wealth and opportunity on the one hand and the 
unequal development of peoples, sectors and regions on the other continued to plague Indian planners sixty one 
years after the country got rid of its colonial yolk. It attempts to explain the impossibility theorem of Arrow, the 
optimality issues of Pareto and Sen’s liberal paradox. In the process, it tables a realpolitik of welfare in Indian 
conditions and takes the candid position that rational choice for voters in a multi-party parliamentary democracy is 
just not possible. Hence, the right candidates may never be elected. If the threshold of welfare is to be raised and 
the quality of life is to improve, the paper argues, India must ideally though not necessarily move from 
parliamentary system to a possible and preferred presidential form of democracy. However, for the greater good of 
the country the system must move from multi-party to a three party democracy. If not, regional and smaller parties 
will fragment people power and our democratic system will lack the muscle required to bring about sustained 
developmental growth. No claim of any epistemological breakthrough is made in the paper except that the author 
has taken well-accepted views of Arrow, Pareto, Sen and others to analyse the present form of democracy in India. 
Keywords: Indian Democracy, Arrow, Sen, Impossibility, Pareto Optimality, Monotonicity 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper will try and put across a case for a three party democracy in India. In doing so, it will demonstrate the 
validity of Arrow’s paradigm and the impossibility of Pareto’s optimality in the present Indian democratic context. 
It is not an exercise in Nihilism but an attempt to show the futility of a multi-party democracy thereby giving other 
scholars a pedestal to put forward a case for a two or three party election system: politically or ideologically with 
one to the left, one to the right and one party in the centre. Religion, caste and regionalism, it is argued, must be a 
strict no-no in a secular democracy, this paper further argues. 
The position taken in this paper springs from the fact that Abraham Lincoln’s universally accepted definition of 
democracy cannot explain realities in the developing world adequately. Seen as being the government of the people, 
by the people and for the people, the definition precisely fails to address the question of “which people”? After the 
American war of independence Lincoln was right at Gettysburg to say what he did. But to maintain the same from 
New Delhi in 2008 would be a gross error. How and why can the rural and the urban populace be expected to think 
alike? Are the people who vote less in number than those who can and do not vote? Are the people in power not 
usually different from those who vote for them? What say does the common man (who votes) have in how the 
country is managed by those uncommon men in power (who rule)? 
At this juncture, we would do well to bear in mind the position of the several politicians who in facing many an 
ideologically charged election have defied all political forecasts and emerged with a majority in Parliament. They 
are worshipped by one section of the populace and reviled by another but yet there is little room for doubt that the 
state they represented has experienced developmental growth in real economic terms, the quality of life of the 
electorate has improved an land reforms have been a thumping success (as the case may be). Six basic premises are 
adopted for the argument and they are stated up front: 
 Parliamentary democracy cannot function effectively on an empty stomach and an empty mind. In short, 
with mass poverty and mass illiteracy, democracy is difficult to practice and India has both of these in 
abundance. 
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 India cannot call itself secular as long as we have unified criminal code but a stratified civil code. It is 
almost the new avatar of the colonial divide and rule policy which seems to have been accepted in the 
name of political correctness. 
 India cannot have about 40% of the electorate casting its vote and still claim a majority has elected that the 
Government in power in New Delhi (at any time). Hence, by that argument, we have never had a majority 
elected party especially after the Emergency.  
 The chance given by history in the 1970s (after Indira Gandhi was assassinated) through a thumping 
majority within Parliament was squandered on a number of issues as is well known. Conversely this is 
also the time when the process of technology driven modernisation began but was unfortunately swamped 
by an retrograde environment that was ill prepared to accept it.  
 India is fast moving from being a state capitalist economy towards becoming a peripheral capitalist 
economy, albeit both of a retarded variety. Hence, we should honourably drop the tag of following a 
“socialistic pattern of society” (whatever that meant), from the political rhetoric in 2008. 
 We must put an end to all micro-nationalistic and regionalist tendencies that divide the nation rather than 
unite it. The sons of the soil theory is fraught with danger since it alienates people from the same country 
making room for illegal immigrants along with whom nefarious elements can easily gain entry into India. 
National security may be jeopardised in the process. 
Without meaning to paint the polity with a wide brush, (which would be un-academic, undesirable and unfair), it is 
argued that there is definitely some room for improvement. The paper further argues that unless a larger number of 
political leaders learn to call a spade a spade and are prepared to walk their talk, Indian planning will forever be 
like what Bernard Shaw said about statistics a blind man, looking for a black cat in a dark room that does not exist. 
Clearly, the current political system is ripe for change and accordingly six positions that this paper takes and tries to 
logically validate.  
• India needs a two or three party system with a presidential form of government if the great divide between 
the urban and rural growth is to be equilibrated (if not bridged). And each political party has to have a 
national status so that it represents a collective voice of democracy and is not bogged down by regional 
issues.  
• As long as parties with a regional caste and religious bias proliferate, we as people cannot stand united. In 
addition, the number of political parties will increase and regional combines will emerge preventing 
leaders from tackling national issues appropriately. Hence, we must suitably address the chimera of 
micro-nationalism, if not eliminate it, altogether. 
• Unless we meet the ongoing anachronism of having too much politics with economics and too little 
economics with politics, head on and ameliorate the situation, sustainable developmental growth (in real 
terms) will remain a pie in the sky for the Indian economy. 
• The time has now come to bid adieu to micro nationalism existing in the form of linguistic division of 
states and macro nationalism manifested in the form of a reservation policy. This requires a political will 
as well as a clarity of purpose which is sadly found wanting 
• Since the Non Aligned Movement that once had an ideological role but strategically, it is now a damp 
squid and the unipolar world economy is becoming a reality. India should enter into Defence Pacts with 
the USA, the USSR and the EU so that its huge defence spending is diverted to real developmental needs. 
After all, the Indian peninsula is surrounded by unfriendly and (some) unstable neighbours having 
substantial nuclear capability to annihilate parts substantial areas before this country retaliates. At the 
same time there is no denying the fact that India’s development need are genuine and urgent. 
• The spread of education needs to be increased, the intelligentsia would do well to stop shunning politics 
and levels of civic consciousness require to be raised. This means the State ought to increase budget 
allocation for formal education and technology training while ensuring though good governance that the 
trickle down effect does take place. Populace at the grass roots level must benefit. 
If the above conditions are met then this paper argues, India has a good chance of addressing the twin 
socio-economic evils: unequal distribution of wealth, incomes and opportunities on the one hand and uneven 
growth of sectors, regions and peoples on the other. These are the two important macroeconomic concerns that need 
to be squarely addressed but which needs political will and which is substantially lacking, as was argued by Sadri 
and Hegde 1996. Up until 2008 the parliamentary form of democracy and its multi-party system has unfortunately 
failed to address these two concerns in an acceptable manner.  The abject failure of the Public Distribution System 
(PDS) is a case in point as is the rising number of peasant-farmer suicides in Western India showing clearly that the 
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growth effects are not trickling down. This paper, using economic welfare theory, as propounded by Kenneth Arrow, 
Vilfredo Pareto and Amartya Sen, will try and demonstrate why the present initiatives cannot succeed and argue 
that a change must be brought about in the democratic system itself. This change is however not solicited for the 
sake of change but through rational diagnosis (prior) and evaluation (post) intervention. According the Quantum 
Theory in Physics, the only certainty is the uncertainty principle and one could be sorely tempted to thus explain 
the dynamic disequilibrium in the markets (including the sharp fall in the BSE and NSE indices) in mid-January of 
2008.  
From a modernist economic point of view equilibrium is a rare phenomenon which if at all it is achieved it will 
only be temporary. The world is going through a corporate Olympiad where change is non-linear and 
non-Newtonian. Systems, structures and functions are concurrently collapsing and so the forces that determine 
demand and supply are in a state of flux. When welfare conditions are to be considered a degree of stability is not a 
precondition and market volatility is an integral part of capitalism. Under such conditions Arrow’s impossibility 
theorem assumes greater significance.  
 
1.1 Ground Reality 
Looking positively, India as a country has a lot to be proud about. Colonial India was divided and Burma (now 
Myanmar) was carved out in 1935. Pakistan was carved out in 1947 and divided into East and West and its 
separation from India was based solely on religious lines. In 1971 East Pakistan broke away from West Pakistan’s 
domination and after a bloody civil war Bangladesh was formed. To the lasting credit of this country even in 2008, 
it remains the only surviving parliamentary democracy in this geo-physical region; and a very vibrant one at that. 
Furthermore, in India, there is more religious tolerance and there are more Muslims residing here than in Pakistan 
or in Bangladesh, which are both Islamic countries. 
It has, however, oft been said that India won its freedom in 1947 but six decades later in 2008 it is still fighting for 
its independence. This independence is not very meaningful in a global environment where cooperation and 
collaboration are fast replacing competition and compliance. (Ohmae 1994). However, it becomes very relevant 
when in a country of about 6 lakh villages and a 1.2 billion strong populace about 60% of the population still 
depend on agriculture in one way or another for its subsistence when 53% of the GDP comes from the services 
sector (mainly IT). Information Technology and Financial Services are merely enablers and it is only logical that 
they are rendered puerile unless there is something to enable. For this to happen the manufacturing sector must pull 
up its socks and the agricultural output per capita must increase in real terms. Whereas there are signs of the first 
happening, the signs of the second were indeed hard to find at least up until 2006. The Tata Group, the Mittal 
Group and a few others have successfully put India on the world manufacturing map. 
Additionally, (as is the case in India) when Direct Foreign Investment (DFI) follows the inflow of Foreign 
Institutional Investment (FII), instead of the other way around, there is some need for serious introspection. 
Therefore, it is no wonder that the comprador class is thriving with stock and bond markets operating on 
speculation rather than on sound economic fundamentals: the real estate sector and the share markets being other 
cases in point. In addition, India has a federal form of Government but a unitary head of State. The founding fathers 
who had framed the Indian Constitution were no doubt alive to the cultural asymmetry across the country and had 
provided for it. The inclusion of a section entitled Directive Principles of State Policy is a vibrant witness to this 
fact. Political expediency has unfortunately placed these in cold storage much to the annoyance of eminent 
constitutional lawyers like Ram Jethmalani (2008). 
As several scholars like Sorabji (2003) and Jethmalani (2008) had argued, Nehru had acted in an un-Gandhian 
manner by not taking the Kashmir question to arbitration in 1948. The Government in Delhi and then attempted to 
write off 93,000 square kilometres of land occupied by China in the 1962 (unprovoked) invasion of India. Here it is 
pertinent to remember that at the crucial moment in history India’s strongest ally, the USSR, maintained a stoic 
silence and it was UK, USA and Israel that sent support to an embattled and outgunned Indian army.   
On the economic front, Nehru introduced economic interventionism when India was relatively non-industrialised 
and the economy was not in a state of recession thus going against the grain of the very Keynesian economic 
thought that Nehru and Mahalanobis sought to champion.  Further damage was done to the political economy 
under the ill-fated Emergency Years when many countervailing tendencies in the polity were systematically 
emasculated and those who took over the reins of the State thereafter could do no better. Over the years the lofty 
visions seem to have been consistently derailed and India has had one coalition government after another at the 
centre. From time to time a call is made for a two party system but it remains a mere will o’ the wisp.  
A spike in the number of terror incidents has led to an increased demand from VIPs for heightened police 
protection in certain regions leaving relatively inadequate security for the common people. This is especially sad 
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when terror camps with Pakistani flags have been spotted in the jungles of Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka 
according to the Times of India, Pune edition 1.2.2008. And yet, Indian parliamentary democracy is still throbbing 
with political vitality in spite of the fact that there remain several areas where progress is both necessary and 
possible. The country is still undivided with the constitutionally guaranteed separation of powers are a robust 
reality. The armed forces have been kept out of politics successfully even when there is a unified criminal code and 
a stratified civil code, when human rights are invoked in defence of terrorists but not in defence of the victims of 
terror, the Kashmiri Pundits and when the criminalisation of politics especially in certain states has become 
rampant. A nadir is truly reached when police chiefs host and fest political leaders who knowingly and wilfully 
create communal strife in a secular country, as was reported in the Times of India, Pune Edition, 07.02.2008. 
In spite of these positive aspects what has most unfortunately emerged in 2008 is a mushrooming of regional 
parties, a growth of fundamentalism and polarisation of views especially after the Pakistan State Sponsored 
Terrorism has taken its deathly toll of the citizenry over the last two decades. The carnage at Godhra and the siege 
of Akshardham are cases in point. Jammu and Kashmir that had hitherto borne the brunt of terror and the mass 
exodus of the Kashmiri Pundits has strengthened Pakistan’s influence over the region.  Of late, terror has struck in 
Uttar Pradesh and even deeper into the sovereign Indian territory, giving the term jihadi an erroneous meaning 
altogether. The Communist Party of India (CPI) that had (decades ago) split into CPI and CPM (Communist Party 
Marxist) and the more liberal variants (have now) latched on to regional combines and coalitions like the Rashtriya 
Janata Dal (RJD) and the Bhujan Samaj Party (BSP). The radical variants of CPI such as CPI-ML 
(Marxist-Leninist) and the Maoists operate non-constitutionally and are not a part of the accepted Indian 
democratic system. They are conspicuous by their silence on the question of the 93,000 square kilometres of Indian 
Territory in Chinese hands and a misguided few would rather point the finger of suspicion towards India! The 
Congress Party retains the public voice of secularism in spite of “Operation Blue Star” and the Sikh massacre as the 
aftermath of Indira Gandhi’s assassination. 
The Parliament’s stand in the Shah Bano Case was similarly retrograde and a blatant attempt to placate the vote 
bank. In this infamous case the Parliament legislated that when the law of the land was at variance with the law of 
the Koran the latter will hold sway. This was the ultimate triumph of political expediency over jurisprudence and 
vote bank imperatives had come to stay. The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) retains its identity like the CPI, 
but its variants in the form of the former Jan Sangh and now the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) as well as its more 
conservative-radicalised offshoots tells a different story. Unfortunately, acrimony of one sort or another plagues a 
militant Bajrang Dal, Shiv Sena and the regionalist Maharashtra Nav Nirman Sena. We concede that often this 
acrimony may not always be of their own making. There are also Ku Klux Clan type organisations on the political 
fringes like the Ranbir Sena in Bihar that is known to pressurise rural voters as well as grabbing booths at gunpoint 
during elections and the Sambhaji Brigade in Mahatashtra that is known for its role in vandalising of the Bori 
Oriental Research Institute some years ago. Under such a scenario, voter choice preferences multiply almost 
exponentially. Pareto optimality becomes an impossible dream even if it were to be desirable. 
The voter is consequently torn between preconceived ideas, caste and religious considerations, socio-economic 
realities, past political affiliations, money and muscle power, and even ambivalence since the percentage who 
actually cast their vote is a lot less than the percentage of those who are eligible to vote. It is against this ground 
reality in the Indian realpolitik that further discussion ensues.  
 
2. Kenneth Arrow's Impossibility Theorem 
Fifty seven years ago, (in 1952) the noted mathematical economist and a co-recipient of the 1972 Nobel Prize in 
Economics, Kenneth Arrow in his Doctoral thesis posited the idea of an impossibility theorem and later popularised 
it in his 1951 book Social Choice and Individual Values. Furthermore, Ng (1988) informs that Arrow (1951) had 
originally called his theorem the General Possibility Theorem since he first had proved another theorem for the 
special case of two alternatives. However as the answer to the General Possibility Theorem was negative it is now 
referred to as the Impossibility Theorem. The original paper of Arrow that was entitled "A Difficulty in the Concept 
of Social Welfare" had proved that there is NO consistent method of making a fair choice among three or more 
candidates. This remarkable result assured thinkers that there is no single election procedure that can always fairly 
decide the outcome of an election that involves more than two candidates or alternatives. In voting systems, 
Arrow’s impossibility theorem, or Arrow’s paradox, demonstrates that no voting system based on ranked 
preferences can possibly meet a certain set of reasonable criteria when there are three or more options to choose 
from. These criteria are called unrestricted domain, non-imposition, non-dictatorship, monotonicity, and 
independence of irrelevant alternatives, and these are briefly explained below. In simple terms, Arrow argues that a 
rule for deriving, from individual ordering of social states, a social ordering consistent with some reasonable 
conditions cannot be found in general.  
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The need to aggregate preferences occurs in many different disciplines: in welfare economics, (Kaldor 1939, Little 
1957, Baummol 1965). Therein one attempts to find an economic outcome which would be acceptable and stable; 
in decision making, where a person has to make a rational choice based on several criteria; and most naturally in 
voting systems, which are mechanisms for extracting a decision from a multitude of voters' preferences. The 
framework for Arrow's theorem assumes that democratic societies need to extract a preference order on a given set 
of options (outcomes). Each individual in the society (or equivalently, each decision criterion) gives a particular 
order of preferences on the set of outcomes. In doing so, we are searching for a preferential voting system, called a 
social welfare function, which transforms the set of preferences into a single global societal preference order. The 
theorem considers the following properties, assumed to be reasonable requirements of a fair voting method: 
 
2.1 Free Triple 
There are at least three among all the alternatives under consideration for which all logical possible individual 
orderings of these three alternatives are admissible.  This condition avoids trivialising the problem posed by 
restricting the sets of individual orderings. Furthermore, there is a positive (non-negative) association between 
alterations in social ordering and individual values that this paper shall soon revert to. 
 
2.2 Non-dictatorship 
This condition is neither suitable for Democratic Centralism nor for National Socialism since it is mildly 
formulated. Moreover, the conditions of Myanmar and Pakistan are clearly ruled out. The social welfare function 
should account for the wishes of multiple voters. It cannot simply mimic the preferences of a single voter, as some 
editorial columns in Indian newspapers had suggested. In recent Indian TV debates an individual is often used as a 
proxy for the party and character assassination wantonly takes place in the name of healthy criticism. There are 
unfortunately several instances showing the triumph of vote bank politics over secularism and the preference, 
which is given to religious, and regionalist over rationalism and ideology. This is a phenomenon visible across the 
country! In the highest dialectic tradition this paper distinguishes between spiritualism and metaphysics (as 
philosophy) and religion (as socio-cultural ritual). (Hegel 1988). The paper further opines that it is the latter and not 
the former case that often impedes sustainable developmental growth. 
 
2.3 Unrestricted Domain or Universality 
The social ordering moreover must not be imposed. The social welfare function should account for all preferences 
among all voters to yield a unique and complete ranking of societal choices. Thus, the voting mechanism must 
account for all individual preferences, it must do so in a manner that results in a complete ranking of preferences 
for society, and it must deterministically provide the same ranking each time voters preferences are presented the 
same way. The Indian system of democracy does not provide such a mechanism largely because of propensity of 
rural India that constitutes a bulk of those voting, cast their ballot on considerations that are not always objective. 
Large scale poverty, low educational spread, and poor national governance most unfortunately makes money and 
muscle power the basic instruments for vote gathering, in some regions of the country. 
 
2.4 Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) 
This condition implies that the choice made by civil society from any given environment depends only on the 
orderings of individuals among alternatives present in that environment. The social welfare function should ideally 
provide the same ranking of preferences among a subset of options as it would for a complete set of options. 
Changes in individuals' rankings of irrelevant alternatives (ones outside the subset) should have no impact on the 
societal ranking of the relevant subset. Unfortunately, in India, issues of caste, creed, family, religion and 
regionalism very often overshadow issues of ideology, politics and economics. Hence alternative choices cannot 
have the same ranking in the minds of the voters even if one would like them to have it.  
 
2.5 Monotonicity 
In Mathematics, a monotonic function or quantity is one that varies in such a way that it never either increases or 
decreases. This term in the Economics of Welfare implies a positive association of social and individual values. So, 
if any individual modifies his or her preference order by promoting a certain option, then the societal preference 
order should respond only by promoting that same option or not changing, never by placing it lower than before. 
An individual should not be able to hurt an option by ranking it higher. Monotonicity in the case of India just does 
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not exist except in the case of the mediocrity that promotes the ‘cult of the personality” and the obsequious 
comprador elements who never tire of saying “yes sir, yes sir, three bags full sir”. 
Public opinion is often shifted radically in the light of certain events. In the USA fo instance the September 11 
attack on the World Trade Centre sparked of an anti-Islamic feeling. In the case of the threat of foreign sponsored 
terrorism, for instance, the Indian vote bank significantly shifts in favour of nationalism and stability irrespective of 
the proclaimed ideology of the party.  
The poverty as well as (lack of) robustness of ideology is clearly shown when some vested interests tried to deny a 
visa extension to Taslima Nasrin and later in 2008 when the Central Government itself played the vote bank card 
yet again when they unsuccessfully requested France to reconsider awarding the Simone de Beauvoir Literary prize 
to Taslima Nasrin. So important has become the placating of the vote bank that in the case of Salman Rushdie’s 
Satanic Verses, citing myopic imperatives, India was the first country that banned the book. This, however, does not 
give an artist a licence to hurt the sentiments of a people as was the case with the legendary M F Hussain. 
It is important to point out that neither the Muslim nor the Hindu community is unitarist. Pluralism can be found 
amongst the Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis, and Christians of India. It would therefore be a socio-historical travesty 
to claim that all Muslims in India support the Taliban, as right wing media often tries to portray. Maulana Jilani 
Ashraf, a Muslim theologian, for instance, in 2008 in trashing such a view was thus quoted “Sufi saints live in 
people’s hearts while invaders have been consigned to history. Following terrorist attacks at several places of 
worship across India, Sufi leaders came together to create a civic organisation to help the government and society 
in its fight against terror.”  A close reading of the Quran would demonstrate that (a) the term jihadi is being 
wantonly misused and (b) there is no place for terrorism in Islam. 
 
2.6 Citizen sovereignty 
This implies a kind of non-imposition of social ordering in any manner whatsoever, and whereby every possible 
societal preference order should be achievable by some set of individual preference orders. This means that the 
social welfare function has an unrestricted target space. Unfortunately, as was witnessed in the case of Nandigram 
where a strange and almost unlikely alliance emerged between the Maoists, the (self-proclaimed) jihadi infiltrators 
and those who were seeking the help of social activists to guard their turf (land) from being acquired in the name of 
development. The questionable role of the ruling party cadres and the faux passé by those in power enabled 
political economists to see CPM at the state and the central levels often taking very different stands. In such 
circumstances too, the importance of Arrow’s theorem is at once highlighted. 
 
Arrow's theorem basically says that if the decision-making body has at least two members and at least three options 
to decide among, then it is impossible to design a social welfare function that satisfies all these conditions at once. 
A 1963 version of Arrow's theorem can possibly be obtained by replacing the monotonicity and non-imposition 
criteria with Pareto Optimality which this paper presently takes up. 
According to the criterion of Pareto efficiency if every individual prefers a certain option to another, then so also 
must the resulting societal preference order. This, again, is a demand that the social welfare function will be 
minimally sensitive to the preference profile. This version of the theorem is stronger—has weaker 
conditions—since monotonicity, non-imposition, and independence of irrelevant alternatives together imply Pareto 
efficiency, whereas Pareto efficiency, non-imposition, and independence of irrelevant alternatives together do not 
imply monotonicity. This moot point needs to be borne in mind while discussing realpolitik. 
Interpretations of Arrow’s Theorem: Arrow's theorem is a mathematical result, but it is often expressed in a 
non-mathematical way with a statement such as (a) no voting method is fair, (b) every ranked voting method is 
flawed, or (c) the only voting method that is not flawed is a dictatorship. These statements are simplifications of 
Arrow's result, which are not universally considered true. What Arrow's theorem does state, however, is that a 
voting mechanism cannot simultaneously comply with all of the conditions given above. 
In this author’s opinion, Arrow had probably used the term "fair" to refer to his criteria. Indeed, this author posits, 
Pareto efficiency, as well as the demand for non-imposition, seems trivial to the rational mind under these 
circumstances. As for the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), for the sake of argument let it be supposed 
that there is a cosmopolitan constituency in Mumbai and that all four contenders are originally non-Mumbaikars 
(non-residents of Mumbai). They are D’Souza, Chatterjee, Bilimoria and Agashe who are running for an important 
political office, and further let it be supposed that Agashe has a clear advantage since he is a Maharashtrian an 
regionalists will back him.  
Now according to Arrow's theorem, there could well be a situation where if D’Souza steps out of the race, it will 
Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development      www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1700 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2855 (Online) 
Vol.3, No.2, 2012 
35 
suddenly be Bilimoria, and not Agashe, who would win the race. This would seem "unfair" by many. Yet it can 
happen, and Arrow's theorem states that these "unfair" situations cannot be avoided in general, without relaxing 
some other criterion. Something has to logically give in. So the important question to be asked, in light of Arrow's 
theorem is which condition should be relaxed? 
Various theorists have suggested weakening the IIA criterion as a way out of the paradox. Hansson 1969 
demonstrated that if we were to impose anonymity or neutrality between persons, and neutrality between 
alternatives, no group decisions could satisfy IIA unless it always declares all alternatives equal. Ng calls this an 
alternative impossibility theorem if we were to stay within the framework of orderings only. Proponents of ranked 
voting methods contend that the IIA is an unreasonably strong criterion, which actually does not hold in most 
real-life situations. Indeed, the IIA criterion is the one that is found breached in most useful voting systems. 
Perhaps this is so. Advocates of this position point out that failure of the standard IIA criterion is trivially implied 
by the possibility of cyclic preferences. [While Condorcet and Borda are usually credited as the founders of voting 
theory, recent research has shown that the philosopher Ramon Llull had discovered both the Borda count and a 
pair-wise method that satisfied the Condorcet criterion in the 13th century. The manuscripts in which he described 
these methods had been lost to history until they were rediscovered a la Hägele and Pukelsheim (2001).  
Simply stated, let it be supposed that voters were to cast their ballots as follows: 
7 votes for A > B > C 
6 votes for B > C > A 
5 votes for C > A > B 
In such a case the net preference of the group is A > B > C > A. In this circumstance, any system that picks a 
unique winner, and satisfies the very basic democratic rule that a candidate who receives a majority of all 
first-choice votes must win the election, will fail the IIAC criterion. Without loss of generality, one may also 
consider that if a system currently picks A, and B drops out of the race, the remaining votes will be: 7 votes for A > 
C and 11 votes for C > A 
Thus, C will win, even though the change (B dropping out) was concerned an "irrelevant" alternative candidate 
who did not win in the original circumstance. 
So, what Arrow's theorem really shows is that voting is a non-trivial game, and that game theory should be used to 
predict the outcome of most voting mechanisms. This could be seen as a discouraging result, because a game need 
not have efficient equilibria, e.g., a ballot could result in an alternative which nobody really wanted in the first 
place, yet everybody had voted for. Indeed, this author would go so far as to argue that this is fine since equilibrium 
is not a necessary but a convenient condition in economics.  
Equilibrium as a concept has drawn several noteworthy comments and contentions. For instance, Kornai, (1971) in 
opposition to Walrasian general equilibrium theory, (Samuelson 1947, Schumpeter 1951) developed in this work an 
alternative framework for a non-Walrasian type of economics, blending elements of organization theory, 
information theory, management science and the new disequilibrium economics. Blaug (1985) correctly describes 
Kornai as one of the few economists of the Eastern bloc who is read with interest by Western economists. In this 
context, one can visualize that Arrow throws up a very interesting view on welfare. Marx (1973) perhaps would 
have been less charitable and some redemption for Walrasian equilibrium could perhaps even arise from Kalecki’s 
concept of business cycles (Sadri and Hegde 1995) and Sraffa’s treatment of dated labour. (Hegde and Sadri 1998) 
Alternative Views: This paper has so far assumed that the "correct" way to deal with Arrow's paradox is to 
eliminate (or weaken) one of the criteria. The IIA criterion is the most natural candidate in this instance. Yet 
literature shows that there are other "ways out". Duncan Black, (1969) for instance, had shown that if there is only 
one agenda by which the preferences are judged, then all of Arrow's axioms are met by the majority rule. In any 
vibrant democracy this is not the case. However, in dictatorships that make a show of democratic elections, this is 
very much possible as in an unstable and volatile Pakistan especially after the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan. 
Technically, this means that if one could properly restrict the domain of the social welfare function, then all could 
go well. Black's restriction, the single-peaked preference principle, states that there is some predetermined linear 
ordering P of the alternative set. Every voter has some special place he likes best along that line, and his dislike for 
an alternative grows larger as the alternative goes further away from that spot.  
Also, in case, for example, there has been a bomb blast of enormous proportion causing severe damage then the 
ensuing election verdict will go in favour of that candidate or party seen to be an antithesis to the forces behind the 
blasts. Then the condition of a single peaked preference may arise. Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination leading to a 
landslide victory for the Congress in the second part of the election is a case in point. Benazir Bhutto’s 
assassination could possibly be another. However, one does not need to be a genius to realise that democratic 
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fairness cannot be ensured when one party uses the tip of the bayonet to ensure a win or when the opposition is 
either buried in their graves, are languishing in prison or have been forced into exile as in Myanmar or Tibet! 
Indeed, many different social welfare functions can meet Arrow's conditions under such restrictions of the domain. 
It has been proved, however, that under any such restriction, if there exists any social welfare function that adheres 
to Arrow's criteria, and then the majority rule will most possibly adhere to Arrow's criteria. Under single-peaked 
preferences, then, the majority rule is in some respects the most natural voting mechanism. It seems to be good 
news for those who thrive on chaos. 
Another common way "around" the paradox is limiting the alternative set to two alternatives. Thus, whenever more 
than two alternatives should be put to the test, it seems very tempting to use a mechanism that pairs them and votes 
by pairs. As tempting as this mechanism seems at first glance, it is generally far from meeting even the Pareto 
principle, not to mention IIA. The specific order by which the pairs are decided strongly influences the outcome. 
This is not necessarily a bad feature of the mechanism. Many sports use the tournament mechanism, essentially a 
pairing mechanism, to choose a winner e.g. heats in track and field events and groups in tennis tournaments. This 
gives considerable opportunity for weaker teams to win, thus adding interest and tension throughout the tournament. 
An example can be found in many cases elections where the voter are either for someone or against that someone 
leaving no scope virtually for candidates who were betwixt and between. Hence, what emerges is a de facto “two 
alternative agenda” for voters. 
In a democracy which is based on sound national governance norms and where ideology rather than religion, caste, 
region, muscle and money matter, voter choices should be limited if the best or Pareto efficient result was to be 
obtained. Alas, in today’s India this is perhaps a utopian idea! This takes us to the questions of determining efficient 
solutions and optimality leading to an examination of Pareto and it is from there that we go on to Amartya Sen who 
had raised critical questions on the paradox. (Sinha and Sen, 2000). However, before engaging Sen perhaps a quick 
examination of Pareto and his economic ideas, would be in order.  
 
3. The Economics of Vilfredo Pareto 
Vilfredo Federico Damaso Pareto was a French-Italian sociologist, economist and philosopher who made several 
important contributions especially in the study of income distribution and in the analysis of individuals' choices and 
so helped to develop the field of microeconomics. He worked as a lecturer in economics at the University of 
Lausanne in Switzerland where he remained for the rest of his life.  There he made the famous observation in 
1906 that twenty percent of the population owned eighty percent of the property in Italy, later generalised by 
Joseph M. Juran and others into the so-called Pareto principle (also termed the 80-20 rule) and generalised further 
to the concept of a Pareto distribution. In his (1916) (1935) work, Pareto had eloquently put forward the first social 
cycle theory in sociology. He is accredited for the famous saying history is a graveyard of aristocracies. 
As social scientists would vouchsafe, a great deal of Talcott Parsons theory of society is based on Pareto’s works. 
Parsons had aimed at formulating a sociology canon made of Durkheim, Weber and Pareto. A wide array of social 
scientists has worked on this general methodological basis.  This was the basis also on which Sadri and Jayashree 
(2000) gave their ethical conception of euthanasia. 
The most widely-used concept in theoretical welfare economics is "Pareto optimality" (also known as "Pareto 
efficiency"). An allocation is Pareto-optimal iff it is impossible to make at least one person better off without making 
anyone else worse off; a Pareto improvement is a change in an allocation which makes someone better off without 
making anyone else worse off. As Hal Varian's Microeconomic Analysis explains, "[A] Pareto efficient allocation is 
one for which each agent is as well off as possible, given the utilities of the other agents." "Better" and "worse" are 
based purely upon subjective preferences which can be summarized in a "utility function," or ordinal numerical index 
of preference satisfaction. 
While initially it might seem that every situation is necessarily Pareto optimal, this is not the case. True, if the only 
good is food, and each agent wants as much food as possible, then every distribution is Pareto optimal. But if half of 
the agents own food and the other half own clothes, the distribution will not necessarily be Pareto optimal, since each 
agent might prefer either more food and fewer clothes or vice versa. 
Normally, economists would expect agents to voluntarily trade in any situation which is not Pareto optimal; but 
neoclassical theorists have considered a number of situations in which trade would be a difficult route to Pareto 
optimality. For example, suppose that each agent is so afraid of the other that they avoid each other, even though they 
could both benefit from interaction. What they need is an independent and powerful organization to e.g. protect both 
agents from each other so that they can reach a Pareto-optimal allocation. What they need, in short, is the state. While 
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economists' examples are usually more elaborate, the basic intuition is that government is necessary to satisfy the 
seemingly uncontroversial principle of Pareto optimality. 
Anarchists of all sorts would immediately object that the very existence of deontological anarchists shows that Pareto 
optimality can never justify state action. If even the slightest increase in the level of state activity incompensably 
harms the deontological anarchist, then obviously it is never true that state action can make some people better off 
without making any others worse off. Moreover, virtually all government action makes some people better off and 
other people worse off, so plainly the pursuit of Pareto improvements has little to do with what real governments do. 
Due to these difficulties, in practice economists must base their judgments upon the far more controversial judgments 
of cost-benefit analysis. (In the works of Richard Posner, this economistic cost-benefit approach to policy decisions is 
called "wealth-maximization"; a common synonym is "Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.") With cost-benefit analysis, there is 
no pretense made that government policy enjoys unanimous approval. Thus, it is open to the many objections 
frequently made to e.g. utilitarianism; moreover, since cost-benefit analysis is based upon agents' willingness to pay, 
rather than on agents' utility, it runs into even more moral paradoxes than utilitarianism typically does. 
In the final analysis, welfare economists' attempt to provide a value-free or at least value-minimal justification of the 
state fails quite badly. Nevertheless, economic analysis may still inform more substantive moral theories: Pareto 
optimality, for example, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a utilitarian justification of the state 
Pareto Optimality: Pareto efficiency, or Pareto optimality, is an important concept in economics with broad 
applications in game theory, engineering and the social sciences. The understanding of the terms optimality or 
efficiency come from Vilfredo Pareto, who used the concepts in his studies of economic efficiency and income 
distribution. Given a set of alternative allocations of, say, goods or income for a set of individuals, a movement 
from one allocation to another that can make at least one individual better off without making any other individual 
worse off is called a Pareto improvement. An allocation is said to be Pareto efficient or Pareto optimal when no 
further Pareto improvements can be made. This is often called a strong Pareto optimum (SPO). 
A weak Pareto optimum (WPO) satisfies a less stringent requirement, in which a new allocation is only considered 
to be a Pareto improvement if it is strictly preferred by all individuals (i.e., all must gain with the new allocation). 
The set of SPO solutions is a subset of the set of WPO solutions, because an SPO satisfies the stronger requirement 
that there is no allocation that is strictly preferred by one individual and weakly preferred by the rest (i.e., no 
individual loses out, and at least one individual gains). Under a parliamentary democracy like India it is perhaps 
easier to approximate conditions of WPO rather than those of SPO given the fluid nature of objective 
socio-political reality. 
Pareto efficiency in economics: An economic system that is Pareto efficient implies that in civil society no 
individual can be made better off without another being made worse off.  Here 'better off' is often interpreted as 
"being put in a more preferred position".  It is commonly accepted that outcomes that are not Pareto efficient are 
to be avoided, and therefore Pareto efficiency is an important criterion for evaluating economic systems and public 
policies. If economic allocation in any system, (in the real world or in a model), is not Pareto efficient, there is 
theoretical potential for a Pareto improvement. This means that an increase in Pareto efficiency through 
reallocation, improvements to at least one participant's well-being can be made without reducing any other 
participant's well-being. This proposition of Pareto fits the democratic requirements of any election in India quite 
easily since those who fight elections have a lot more at stake than just their reputation. 
Logically speaking, in the real world, however, ensuring that nobody is disadvantaged by a change aimed at 
improving economic efficiency may require compensation of one or more parties. For instance, if a change in 
economic policy dictates that a legally protected monopoly (e.g. Indian Railways) ceases to exist and that market 
subsequently becomes competitive and more efficient, the monopolist (the Indian state) will be made worse off. 
However, the loss to the monopolist will be more than offset by the gain in efficiency. This means the monopolist 
can be compensated for its loss while still leaving an efficiency gain to be realised by others in the economy. Thus, 
the requirement of nobody being made worse off for a gain to others is met. Implicitly this assumes that policy 
makers will prefer the greater good of the greater number, summum bonum, over personal consequences. And there 
is scant evidence to prove in recent times that this is likely to happen. 
In the real-world the compensation principle that is often appealed to is hypothetical. That is, for the alleged Pareto 
improvement, say from public regulation of the monopolist or removal of tariffs like Octroi, or other losers from a 
policy change are not (fully) compensated. The change thus results in distribution effects in addition to any Pareto 
improvement that might have taken place. The theory of hypothetical compensation is an important part of 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, but which this author opines can be bypassed for the paper’s argument. No doubt, the 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion captures some of the intuitive appeal of Pareto Efficiency, but it takes into account 
the absolute level of income but disregards distribution altogether as Posner (2007) has also argued. It is for this 
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reason that it is considered not quite relevant to this author’s discussion on India. This takes the present discussion 
a mite further towards the Paretian compensation principle. 
Simply stated, the compensation principle in welfare economics refers to a decision rule used to select between 
pairs of alternative feasible social states. One of these states is the hypothetical point of departure ("the original 
state").Therefore, if the prospective gainers could compensate (any) prospective losers and leave no one worse off, 
the other state is to be selected (Chipman, 1987). An example of a compensation principle is the Pareto criterion in 
which a change in states entails that such compensation is not merely feasible but required. The two variants are: (a) 
the Pareto principle, which requires any change such that all gain. (b) The (strong) Pareto criterion, which requires 
any change such that at least one gains and no one loses from the change.  
In non-hypothetical contexts such that in which the compensation occurs (e.g. in the marketplace), invoking the 
compensation principle becomes unnecessary to effect the change. Its use is more controversial and complex 
wherein full compensation is feasible but not made, and also in the case of selecting among more than two feasible 
social states. In its specifics, it is also more controversial where the range of the decision rule itself is at issue. In 
fledging yet robust democracies like India where the comprador elements are often in positions of political power, 
the compensation principle remains a pipe dream of welfare economics who write on perfect and imperfect 
competition, social choice theory and social cost benefit analysis. 
Under certain idealised conditions, however, it can be shown that a system of free markets will lead to a Pareto 
efficient outcome. This is called the first welfare theorem. It was first demonstrated mathematically by economists 
Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu in 1954. However, the result does not rigorously establish welfare results for 
real economies because of the restrictive assumptions necessary for the proof are borrowed from Marshallian neo 
classical economics. Do we have a condition wherein markets exist for all possible goods, markets are perfectly 
competitive, transaction costs are negligible, and there must be no externalities? 
An alleged key drawback of Pareto optimality is its localisation and partial ordering, especially in a border-less 
world a la Ohmae, 1994. In an economic system with millions of variables there can be very many local optimum 
points. The Pareto improvement criterion does not define any global optimum. Given a reasonable criterion which 
compares all points, many Pareto-optimal solutions may be far inferior to the global best solution. Unless there is a 
two or three party political system and each contender has a national agenda, this paper opines, a global optimum is 
impossible. And, yet every positive economist will vouchsafe that a global optimum is necessary for sustained 
developmental growth! (c f Anand and Sen, 1996, 2000) 
The graphical figure given above shall elucidate this concept of the Pareto Frontier further. It presents an example 
of the Pareto frontier, given that lower values are preferred to higher values. Point C is not on the Pareto Frontier 
because it is dominated by both point A and point B. Points A and B are non-inferior, (c.f Kreyszig 1972 for a 
mathematical explanation) 
For a given system, the Pareto frontier or Pareto set is basically defined as the set of parameterizations (allocations) 
that are all Pareto efficient. Finding Pareto frontiers is particularly useful in engineering and economic modelling. 
By yielding all of the potentially optimal solutions, a designer can make focused tradeoffs within this constrained 
set of parameters, rather than needing to consider the full ranges of parameters a la Erwin Kreyszig, 1971: 
 
 
 
 
4. Pareto Frontier 
Given below is an example of Pareto frontier, given that lower values are preferred to higher values. Point C is not on 
the Pareto Frontier because it is dominated by both point A and point B. Points A and B are non-inferior. 
Example of a Pareto frontier. The boxed points represent feasible choices, and smaller values are preferred to larger 
ones. Point C is not on the Pareto Frontier because it is dominated by both point A and point B. Points A and B are 
not strictly dominated by any other, and hence do lie on the frontier. 
Given a set of choices and a way of valuing them, the Pareto frontier or Pareto set is the set of choices that are Pareto 
efficient. The Pareto frontier is particularly useful in engineering: by restricting attention to the set of choices that are 
Pareto-efficient, a designer can make tradeoffs within this set, rather than considering the full range of every 
parameter. 
The Pareto frontier (Figure 1) is defined formally as follows. 
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Consider a design space with n real parameters, and for each design-space point there are m different criteria by 
which to judge that point. Let be the function which assigns, to each design-space point x, a 
criteria-space point f(x). This represents the way of valuing the designs. Now, it may be that some designs are 
infeasible; so let X be a set of feasible designs in , which must be a compact set. Then the set which represents the 
feasible criterion points is f(X), the image of the set X under the action of f. Call this image Y. 
Now construct the Pareto frontier as a subset of Y, the feasible criterion points. It can be assumed that the preferable 
values of each criterion parameter are the lesser ones, thus minimizing each dimension of the criterion vector. Then 
compare criterion vectors as follows: One criterion vector x strictly dominates (or "is preferred to") a vector y if each 
parameter of x is no greater than the corresponding parameter of y and at least one parameter is strictly less: that is, 
for each i and for some i. This is written as to mean that x strictly dominates y. Then the 
Pareto frontier is the set of points from Y that are not strictly dominated by another point in Y. 
Formally, this defines a partial order on Y, namely the (opposite of the) product order on (more precisely, the 
induced order on Y as a subset of ), and the Pareto frontier is the set of maximal elements with respect to this 
order. 
Algorithms for computing the Pareto frontier of a finite set of alternatives have been studied in computer science. 
There, this task is known as the maximum vector problem or as skyline query. 
 
5. Relationship to Marginal Rate of Substitution 
An important fact about the Pareto frontier in economics is that at a Pareto efficient allocation, the marginal rate of 
substitution is the same for all consumers. A formal statement can be derived by considering a system with 
m consumers and n goods, and a utility function of each consumer as zi = fi(xi) where 
 is the vector of goods, both for all i. The supply constraint is written for 
 
. To optimize this problem, the Lagrangian is used: 
where λ and Γ are multipliers. 
 
Taking the partial derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to one good, i, and then taking the partial derivative of the 
Lagrangian with respect to another good, j, gives the following system of equations: 
 
                                              for j=1,...,n. for i = 2,...,m and j=1,...,m, where fx is the marginal utility 
on f' of x (the partial derivative of f with respect to x). 
 
for i,k=1,...,m and j,s=1,...,n...,. 
 
 
6. Criticism 
Pareto efficiency does not consider the equity of resource allocations. It may be that one economic agent owns all 
of the world's resources; it would be impossible to make anyone else better off without taking something away 
from this agent. Thus this situation is described as "Pareto optimal", even though it is inequitable. 
More generally, it can be misleading, in that "not Pareto optimal" implies "can be improved" (making someone better 
off without hurting anyone), but "Pareto optimal" does not imply "cannot be improved" by some measure—it only 
implies that someone must receive less. Thus if an allocation is not Pareto optimal, it means that one can improve it, 
but does not mean that one should categorically reject it for a Pareto optimal solution. More importantly, not all 
Pareto optimal states are equally desirable from the standpoint of society in general. For instance, a one-time transfer 
of wealth from the very wealthy to the very poor may not be a Pareto improvement but may nevertheless result in a 
new Pareto optimal state that is more socially desirable than the previous one. 
It must be realised that Pareto efficiency does not require an equitable distribution of wealth. So we can as well 
speak of Pareto efficiency in the Indian context. An economy in which the wealthy hold the vast majority of 
resources can be Pareto efficient. This possibility is inherent in the definition of Pareto efficiency; by requiring that 
an allocation leave no participant worse off, Pareto efficiency tends to favour outcomes that do not depart radically 
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from the status quo. Amartya Sen has elaborated the mathematical basis for this criticism, pointing out that under 
relatively plausible starting conditions, systems of social choice will converge to Pareto efficient, but inequitable, 
distributions.  
A simple example of the above is the distribution of a pie among three people. The most equitable distribution 
would assign one third to each person. However the assignment of, say, a half section to each of two individuals 
and none to the third is also Pareto optimal despite not being equitable, because none of the recipients is left worse 
off than before, and there are many other such distributions. An example of a Pareto inefficient distribution of the 
pie would be allocation of a quarter of the pie to each of the three, with the remainder discarded. The origin of the 
pie is conceived as immaterial in these examples. In such cases, in which a "windfall" that none of the potential 
distributees actually produced is to be allocated (e.g., land, inherited wealth, a portion of the broadcast spectrum, or 
some other resource), the criterion of Pareto efficiency does not determine a unique optimal allocation. 
There has developed an entire literature following from Arrow's original work which finds other impossibilities as 
well as some possibility results. For example, if we weaken the requirement that the social choice rule must create a 
social preference ordering which satisfies transitivity and instead only require acyclicity, (if a is preferred to b, and 
b is preferred to c, then it is not the case that c is ipso facto preferred to a), there do exist social choice rules which 
satisfy Arrow's requirements. 
 
7. Sen and The Paretian Liberal Paradox 
The Nobel Prize winning economist, Amartya Sen has suggested at least two other alternatives. He has offered both 
relaxation of transitivity and removal of the Pareto principle. He has shown the existence of voting mechanisms 
which comply with all of Arrow's criteria, but supply only semi-transitive results. Also, he has demonstrated 
another interesting impossibility result, known as the "impossibility of the Paretian Liberal". Sen went on to argue 
that this demonstrates the futility of demanding Pareto optimality in relation to voting mechanisms. In 1970 Sen 
had advanced, in the tradition of Voltaire, the definition of a liberal as that which represents a value involving 
individual liberty, (c.f. Mill 1967) which many (including this author) would prescribe to. He went on to 
demonstrate that the liberal so defined would conflict with the principle of Pareto optimality.  
Several scholars like Hillinger and Lapham (1971)  disagree with Sen.  Others like Aldrich (1977) refer to it as 
Sen’s dilemma. The liberal paradox remains a powerful and logical paradox advanced by Sen. Building on the 
work of Arrow and his general possibility theorem, which showed that within a system of menu-independent social 
choice, it is impossible to have both a commitment to "Minimal Liberty", which was defined as the ability to order 
tuples of choices, and Pareto optimality. Since this theorem was advanced in 1970, it has attracted a wide body of 
commentary from philosophers such as Buchanan (1978). Nozick (1974) in Anarchy, State, and Utopia, argues 
among other things, that a distribution of goods is just, so long as the distribution was brought about by free 
exchanges by consenting adults and was made from a just starting position, even if large inequalities emerge from 
the process.  
Nozick appealed to the) idea that people should be treated as ends (what he termed 'separateness of persons'), not 
merely as a means. (See Kant 1936, 1980) For example, forced redistribution of income treated people as if they 
were merely sources of money. Nozick here challenged John Rawls's arguments in A Theory of Justice that 
conclude that just inequalities in distribution must benefit the least well off. Nozick had however, backed away 
from some of the views he expressed in Anarchy, State, and Utopia in one of his later books, The Examined Life, 
(1981) calling those views "seriously inadequate."  
The most contentious aspect is, on one hand, to contradict the libertarian notion that the market mechanism is 
sufficient to produce a Pareto-optimal society, and on the other hand it argues that degrees of choice and freedom, 
rather than welfare economics should be the defining trait of that market mechanism. As a result, it attracts 
commentary from both the left and the right of the political spectrum. This commentary ought to be, in this author’s 
opinion, honestly seen in Sen’s patently liberal ethic. 
(Democratic) Freedom at its liberal best is a crucial aspect in Amartya Sen’s weltanschauung. We can see that Sen 
had always argued that expansion of freedom is both the primary end and the principal means of development. 
Sen's approach therefore re-established the word ‘freedom’ as referring to the enhancement ‘human capabilities’ 
which involve processes of decision making, as well as opportunities to achieve valued outcomes, i.e. the 
substantive freedom of people to lead the lives they have reason to value and to enhance the real choices they have. 
For instance, in Development as Freedom, (1999) Sen, argued that expansion of human freedom should both be 
viewed as the primary end and the principle means of development.  His normative theory of development to a 
large extent justified a particular focus on inequality and poverty. His perspective on democratic reasoning as the 
constructive vehicle for valuation based exercises, and in particular how well this perspective fit into the human 
Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development      www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1700 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2855 (Online) 
Vol.3, No.2, 2012 
41 
development framework of UNDP is uncommonly brilliant. The relevance of markets within the freedom approach, 
and some of the most important empirical interconnections between different freedoms studied by him clearly show 
him as not only a profound scholar but also a humanist to the core. Understanding this point about Sen will make 
the argument in this paper a little more meaningful. 
 
8. Sen’s Theorem 
The formal statement of the theorem on the basis of which this discussion is mooted is as follows. 
Suppose there is a set of social outcomes X with at least two alternatives and there is a group of at least two 
individuals each with preferences over X. 
A benign social planner has to choose a single outcome from the set using the information about the individuals' 
preferences. The planner uses a social choice function. For every possible set of preferences, a social choice function 
selects a choice. 
There are two desirable properties we might ask of the social choice function: 
 
• A social choice function respects the "Paretian principle" (also called Pareto optimality) if it never selects an 
outcome when there is an alternative that everybody strictly prefers. So if there are two choices, (x,y) such 
that for all individuals, then the social choice function does not select x. 
• A social choice function respects "Minimal liberalism" if there are two individuals whose preferences can 
veto some social outcomes. 
 
That is, there is one individual called i and one pair of alternatives a,b such that if i strictly prefers a to b then the 
social choice function cannot chose b and vice-versa. 
Similarly there must be another individual called j whose preferences can veto a choice over a (possibly different) 
pair of alternatives c,d. If then the social choice function cannot select d. 
Sen's version of the impossibility theorem establishes that it's impossible for the social planner to satisfy condition 1 
and condition 2. In other words, for every social choice function there is at least one set of preferences that force the 
planner to violate condition (1) or condition (2). 
But this is Pareto inefficient given that Arti and Dilip each think both to go > neither to go.  
 
DILIP 
Goes  Doesn't 
ARTI 
Goes 4,3 → 2,4 
 ↑  ↓ 
Doesn't 1,1 → 3,2 
The diagram shows the strategy graphically. The numbers represent ranks in Arti and Dilip's personal preferences, 
relevant for Pareto efficiency (thus, either 4,3 or 2,4 is better than 1,1 and 4,3 is better than 3,2 – making 4,3 and 2,4 
the two solutions). The arrows represent transitions suggested by the individual preferences over which each has 
liberty,  
Voting Choice and Game Theory: Voting choice is an integral part of democratic processes as well as Welfare 
Economics. Following Nash (1950) let us suppose that a girl (Arti) marries a man (Dilip) and both are graduates of 
XLRI are now living in Bihar. However Arti comes with a liberal family upbringing while Dilip comes from a 
tradition bound family. Arti’s family are supporters of the Rashtriya Janta Dal (RJD) while Dilip’s family are 
supporters of the Congress. There is a big political rally organised in Gandhi Maidan in Patna and an RJD big wig 
is scheduled to address it. 
Suppose Arti and Dilip have to decide whether to go to the rally to hear the big wig speaking and that each has the 
liberty to decide whether to go by themselves. If the personal preferences are based on Arti first wanting to be with 
Dilip, then thinking it is a good rally, and on Dilip first wanting Arti to see it but then not wanting to go himself, 
then the personal preference orders might be thus:  
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• Arti wants: both to go > neither to go > Arti to go > Dilip to go  
                                                     or  
• Dilip wants: Arti to go > both to go > neither to go > Dilip to go  
 
Then two Pareto efficient solutions would emerge: either Arti goes alone or they both go. Clearly Dilip will not go 
on his own: he would not set off alone, but if he did then Arti would follow, and Arti's personal liberty means the 
joint preference must have both to go > Dilip to go. However, since Arti also has personal liberty if Dilip does not 
go, the joint preference must have neither to go > Arti to go. But Dilip has personal liberty too, so the joint 
preference must have Arti to go > both to go and neither to go > Dilip to go. Combining these gives us a condition 
of joint preference. 
 
8.1 Joint Preference 
This can be elucidated as neither to go > Arti to go > both to go > Dilip to go, and in particular neither to go > both 
to go. So the result of these individual preferences and personal liberty is that neither goes to see the film. But this 
is Pareto inefficient given that Arti and Dilip each think both to go > neither to go. In short, whenever 
socio-cultural externalities impinge upon the rational decision making process the voter tends to operate at a Pareto 
inefficient level. And in a civil society plagued by religiosity (not to be confused with spiritualism or metaphysics) 
as well as a polity where governments are formed by coalition of parties and parliament is “hung” the condition is 
bound to be Pareto inefficient.  
 
8.2 Liberalism and Externalities 
The example of India, cited above, shows that liberalism and Pareto-efficiency conflict and is difficult to be 
attained at the same time. Hence, if liberalism exists in just a rather constrained way, as Sen suggests, externalities 
could arise. However, this is not always the case. For instance if one individual (a Hindu girl) makes use of her 
liberal right to decide between two alternatives (a Muslim and a Hindu paramour), chooses one of them and if the 
civil society would also prefer this alternative, no problem arises. 
Nevertheless, the general case will be that there are some externalities. For instance, one individual is free to go to 
work wearing either decent or in formal clothes. If the individual wears just decent clothes to work, whereas 
society wants him to go to work n formal attire, there will be an externality. However, no one can force the other to 
wear just decent clothes or a lecturer in a B-School not to wear sandals to class when there is a formal Western 
dress code for students. So, one implication of Sen's paradox is that these externalities will exist wherever 
liberalism exists. Nevertheless, there are some ways out of this dilemma. Their successful application makes sure 
that both liberalism and Pareto-efficiency can be attained. (Sen and Dreze 1999) 
Ways out of the paradox: there are at least three ways out of the paradox, as we shall examine. 
First, the way Sen preferred, the individuals may decide simply to "respect" each other's choice by constraining 
their own choice. Assume that individual A orders three alternatives (x, y, z) according to x P y P z and individual B 
orders the same alternative according to z P x P y: according to the above reasoning, it will be impossible to 
achieve a Pareto-efficient outcome. But, if A refuses to decide over z and B refuses to decide over x, then for A 
follows x P y (x is chosen), and for B z P y (z is chosen). Hence A chooses x and respects that B chooses z; B 
chooses z and respects that A chooses x. So, the Pareto-efficient solution can be reached, if A and B constrain 
themselves and accept the freedom of the other player. This scenario can unfold if society is divided in a bipolar 
fashion with respect to their choice of candidates in a democratic election. More particularly in smaller societies 
like a housing cooperative the likelihood of this happening is more.    
For the second way out of the paradox Sen drew his argument from game theory by assuming that individuals A 
and B pursue self-interested actions, when they decide over alternatives or pairs of alternatives. Hence, the 
collective outcome will be Pareto-inferior as the prisoner's dilemma predicts. The way out (except tit-for-tat) will 
be to sign a contract, so trading away one's right to act selfishly and get the other's right to act selfishly in return. 
Suppose in an era of political coalitions there emerge two dominant coalitions from which the electorate has to 
choose one. Suppose further that civil society is divided in a bipolar manner such that persons from one camp 
would have to compulsorily vote for one coalition candidate and so forth. Under such conditions the collective 
outcome is likely to be Pareto-inferior. And, this is more likely to happen under democratic centralism than under a 
parliamentary democracy. 
A third possibility starts with assuming that again A and B have different preferences towards four states of the 
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world, w, x, y, and z. A's preferences are given by w P x P y P z; B's preferences are given by y P z P w P x. Now, 
liberalism, (in this context), implies that each individual is a dictator in a least one social area. Hence, both A and B 
should be allowed to decide at least over one pair of alternatives. For A, the "best" pair will be (w, z), because w is 
most preferred and z is least preferred. Hence A can decide that w is chosen and at the same time make sure that z 
is not chosen. For B, the same applies and implies, that B would most preferably decide between y and x. 
Furthermore assuming that A is not free to decide (w, z), but has to choose between y and x, then A will choose x. 
Conversely, if B is just allowed to choose between w and z the choice will eventually will rest with z. The 
collective outcome will be (x, z), which is Pareto-inferior. Hence again A and B can make each other better off by 
employing a contract and trading away their right to decide over (x, y) and (w, z). The contract makes sure that A 
decides between w and z and chooses w. B decides between (x, y) and chooses y. The collective outcome will be (w, 
y), the Pareto-optimal result.  
Taken all together the three ways do not resolve the paradox as such. But, they answer the question: What can 
society do, if the paradox applies and no corresponding social decision function can negate it? 
Alternatives (IIA): The reason that the IIA property might not be realistically satisfied in human decision-making of 
any complexity is twofold:  
 
• The scalar preference ranking is derived from the weighting (not usually explicit) of a vector 
of attributes.  
• A new option can "focus the attention" on a different attribute or set of attributes, changing 
the tacit weighting and thus the resultant scalar ranking for the previous options.  
 
MacNeal using the logic of the second reason had discussed the instability of a scalar ranking of "most liveable 
city" with regard to different weighting of a vector of criteria in the chapter "Surveys" of his 1994 book. The term 
Mathsemantics as used by him first appeared in 1994 to reflect the combination of math and semantics, the studies 
of number and meaning, as used here in its broadest sense. 
Working from a premise of “bounded rationality” Herbert Simon (1972) had earlier noted that studies which 
appeared to show that political campaigns were relatively ineffective in indoctrinating voters with new ideas may 
have been missing the point. Rational behaviour, in economics, generally means that an individual maximizes his 
utility function under the constraints faced (e.g., their budget constraint, limited choices, social obligations, cultural 
values etc.) in pursuit of their self-interest.  As the some recent political campaigns have shown, rhetoric can be 
quite effective in focusing voter's attention on a certain set of issues of which they already have some awareness, 
and hence convincing the voter that these are the issues on which the election should be decided. Therefore, it is 
only logical that an astute leader would take the developmental growth path to spread his/her message of success. 
This is in agreement with Bendor (2003) who contended that though Herbert Simon's work, is often cited by 
political scientists, it has not generated a large research program in that discipline. The main challenge to the 
rational choice research program can perhaps be developed by building on Simon's ideas on bounded rationality. 
Bendor defends this assertion by examining how the work of both the early Simon (primarily 
satisficing-and-search models) and the later Simon (on problem solving) can shed light on important topics in our 
discipline such as budgeting, turnout, and party competition. In the Indian context, this author opines, Sen’s 
paradox is best understood when seen in terms of Herbert Simon’s bounded rationality. 
Logically speaking, Sen's paradox is the following: Suppose there are at least two persons and at least three 
alternatives. Take a voting system (a rule that associates a ordering of the alternatives to all profiles of individual 
orderings) satisfying the following conditions: (i) Unrestricted Domain (UD): Each individual can rank the 
alternatives in any transitive manner she likes. (ii) Pareto (P): If all individuals rank alternative A above B, the 
voting system does the same. (iii) Minimal Liberalism (ML): There are two different individuals and each of them 
has a pair off alternatives over which she is decisive, that is the voting system ranks them like that individual. It is 
logical then that the voting system allows cycles a1<a2<...<an<a1, at some profiles. 
ML means that individuals can decide on some issues without any inference by anyone else. So how does the 
paradox come to be? Saari, (1998) for instance, gives the following explanation: If we would allow people to have 
cyclic preferences, having a cycle as the social outcome would be natural. Now ML makes us ignore a part of the 
preferences of almost everyone. This information would be necessary to differentiate between cyclic and transitive 
preferences. So every procedure that satisfies ML must respect the wishes of both rational and dumb people- and 
can't tell the difference. An exposition is given in his book Decisions and Elections. The anti-incumbency factor 
that is often spoken about is a good example of how this cyclical fluctuation takes place. This cycle is nothing else 
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but a reflection of what in India is referred to as the anti-incumbency factor, when the electorate shuns a sitting 
candidate for non-fulfilment of election promises. 
 
9. Democratic Systems 
When we review arguments and empirical evidence in the comparative literature that bear on the differences in the 
survival rates of parliamentary and presidential democracies, we discover that most of these arguments focus on the 
fact that presidential democracies are based on the separation of executive and legislative powers, whereas 
parliamentary democracies are based on the fusion of these powers. The implications of this basic distinction lead 
to radically different behavior and outcomes under each regime. This paper argues that this perspective is 
misguided and that one cannot deduce the functioning of the political system from the way governments are formed. 
Other provisions, constitutional and otherwise, also affect the way parliamentary and presidential democracies 
operate, and these provisions may counteract some of the tendencies that we would expect to observe if we derived 
the regime's performance from its basic constitutional principle. 
A parliamentary system, also known as parliamentarianism is distinguished by the executive branch of government 
being dependent on the direct or indirect support of the parliament, often expressed through a vote of confidence. 
Hence, there is no clear-cut separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches, leading to a 
differing set of checks and balances compared to those found in a presidential republic. Parliamentary systems 
usually have a clear differentiation between the head of government and the head of state, with the head of 
government being the prime minister or premier, and the head of state often being an elected (either popularly or 
through parliament) president or hereditary monarch. Though in Parliamentary systems the prime minister and 
cabinet will exercise executive power on a day-to-day basis, actual authority will usually be bestowed in the head 
of state, giving them many codified or un-codified reserve powers, providing some balance to these systems. 
One main criticism of many parliamentary systems is that the head of state is in almost all cases not directly elected. 
In a presidential system, the president is usually chosen directly by the electorate, or by a set of electors directly 
chosen by the people, separate from the legislature. However, in a parliamentary system the prime minister is 
elected by the legislature, often under the strong influence of the party leadership. Thus, a party's candidate for the 
head of government is usually known before the election, possibly making the election as much about the person as 
the party behind him or her. 
Another major criticism of the parliamentary system lies precisely in its purported advantage: that there is no truly 
independent body to oppose and veto legislation passed by the parliament, and therefore no substantial check on 
legislative power. Conversely, because of the lack of inherent separation of powers, this author believes that a 
parliamentary system can place too much power in the executive entity, leading to the feeling that the legislature or 
judiciary has little scope to administer checks or balances on the executive.  
A presidential system, also called a congressional system, is a system of government where an executive branch 
exists and presides (hence the term) separately from the legislature, to which it is not accountable and which cannot 
in normal circumstances dismiss it. The defining characteristic of a republican presidential system is how the 
executive is elected, but nearly all presidential systems share the following features: 
• The president bills. In systems such as that of the United States, the president has the power to veto acts of 
the legislature and, in turn, a supermajority of legislators may act to override the veto. This practice is 
derived from the British tradition of royal assent in which an act of parliament cannot come into effect 
without the assent of the monarch.  
• The president has a fixed term of office. Elections are held at scheduled times, and cannot be triggered by 
a vote of confidence or other such parliamentary procedures. However, many presidential systems 
incorporate provisions for the president's trial and subsequent removal from office by the legislature if he 
or she is found to have committed a crime.  
• The executive branch is uni-personal. Members of the cabinet serve at the pleasure of the president and 
must carry out the policies of the executive and legislative branches. However, presidential systems 
frequently require legislative approval of presidential nominations to the cabinet as well as various 
governmental posts such as judges. A president generally has power to direct members of the cabinet, 
military or any officer or employee of the executive branch, but generally has no power to dismiss or give 
orders to judges.  
• The concept of a presidential system is distinct. We should not confuse it with the title of President or the 
Republican form of government. For example, a dictator not popularly or legitimately elected is frequently 
styled "president". Likewise, many other parliamentary democracies are formally styled republics and 
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have presidents, a position that is largely ceremonial; notable examples include Israel, the Czech Republic, 
Germany and Ireland. 
Clearly, there are arguments for and against both forms of democracy but as Pylee argues, the Constitutional 
Drafting Committee (1950) had tried to assimilate both. However, as this author has maintained in his other works, 
India has successfully registered development-less-growth and the much touted trickle down effects since the 
economic reforms of 1991 have not fructified. 
 
10. Conclusion 
This paper argues that the present system of parliamentary democracy in India cannot either provide a rational 
voter choice or deliver optimal growth results. Hence, a case for change in the political system is called for. To 
support this argument the author has adopted the Welfare route and taken the help of three great scholars: Kenneth 
Arrow, Vilfredo Pareto and Amartya Sen. 
Compared with other democracies, it this paper further holds that the United States has a much-decentralized 
structure of government. That is not to suggest that their system is flawless or that it cannot be circumvented to suit 
a personal agenda, as has been witnessed in recent years. The founding fathers of the U.S. Constitution were 
perhaps wary of the potential dangers of concentrating power in any single political institution, and so deliberately 
undertook to divide authority among different branches and levels of government. The American model of 
democratic government, pluralist democracy, has a number of advantages over the majoritarian model. Pluralist 
democracy requires government power to be dispersed and authority to be decentralized. According to this model, 
democracy exists when government authority is divided among multiple centers of power that are open to interests 
of various groups—for example, labor v. management, farmers v. food stores, coal companies v. environmentalists. 
Groups like these compete against each other in a pluralistic society. The dispersion of authority in pluralist theory 
prevents government from taking hasty, possibly imprudent action, but it also can prevent any action if important 
power centers disagree. Although decentralization of power characterizes American government, some institutional 
features tend to centralize power, enabling government to act even while lacking universal agreement on policy. A 
two-party system is a form of party system where two major political parties dominate voting in nearly all elections. 
As a result, all, or nearly all, elected offices end up being held by candidates endorsed by one of the two major 
parties. Coalition governments occur only rarely in two-party systems, though each party may internally look like a 
coalition. 
Under a two-party system, one of the two parties typically holds a majority in the legislature (or a legislative house 
in a bicameral system), and is referred to as the majority party. The other party is referred to as the minority party. 
Notable examples of countries with "two party systems" include the United States and Jamaica. Some countries 
that feature weak third or fourth parties, such as the United Kingdom and Australia are often thought of being two 
party states as well, as actual governance of the country may be dominated by only two parties, with other parties 
having bases of support that are much smaller or stagnant (or both). In India, with too many political parties in the 
fray any universal agreement is often watered down into a common minimum program. Coalition governments are 
highly unstable and regional leaders are often both myopic and Quixotic. Horse trading on the floor of the 
Parliament becomes passé’. The voter is also confused, as every leader seems to promise almost the same things 
come election time. If the margin of choice were to be narrowed, this author argues, a more eligible candidate has a 
chance of being elected to political office. 
If Arrow’s impossibility theorem is valid and this author believes that it is. If a Pareto optimal solution is difficult to 
obtain, as this author believes that it is, especially since the market mechanism, which is dynamically 
disequilibrated, hardly provides the conditions for it. Then the logical choice would be to go along with Sen’s 
democratic freedom. In a country like India where dissipation of agendas is as varied as the number of political 
parties in the fray, the number of choices needs to be limited. This is especially so when we are acting within the 
bounds of a collective bounded rationality. The logical option then is to have a three party system, one to the 
ideological left, the other to the ideological right and one betwixt and between.  
It is common knowledge that over the past two decades the three big parties (Congress, BJP and CPI) have been 
unable to form and sustain an elected government without a coalition with others. [The CPM in West Bengal too 
had to take the support of the Forward Bloc]. Micro nationalism in the guise of regional political parties and 
linguistic alliances on the one hand and macro nationalism, in the form of reservation policies, religious quotas and 
subsidies as well as appeasement of minorities, and on the other is eating away on the fabric of democracy. Unless 
we address these issues squarely we may not have anything by way of a robust political system that is left to pass 
on to posterity. The answer, in this author’s opinion, lies in assimilating combining and collating fragmented groups 
into national level parties on ideological lines. If cooperation and strategic alliances have taken root in the market 
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place why should it not do the same in the political arena? What prevents a group of parties shunning their 
individuality and coming under a common banner? This is not to be mistaken with a common minimum program 
which is satisfied with the lowest common denominator in activity and parties stooping (low) to please the coalition 
partners sans ideological justification, save keeping others out and themselves in positions of power!. 
Recent events have borne out the argument posited herein and strengthened he author’s belief in the proposed 
political restructuring. The verdict of the last elections is out and mandate is clear. It irrevocably points to three 
things:  
•  Regional parties do have clout but they need to move out of their provincial focus and think in national 
terms. If not they will remain on the fringes of the national polity.  
• The centrists have won and yet are seeking alliances with regional parties in areas there they did not fare 
well. This would be ill-advised as the common minimum program as well as dictated by vote bank politics 
would stifle progress.  
• The “third front” a term used for a cluster of pro-secular parties, is history and the Left has had to eat the 
humble pie mostly due to its own miscalculation and obscurantism. Nevertheless neither the regional 
parties nor the Left can be written off. Perhaps the regional parties should merge rather than align with any 
of the big three and have a national agenda for greater stability of this country. The various Communist 
Parties should combine and put forth a cogent national alternative giving the voter to make an enlightened 
choice. 
 
This proposed three party system, it is further opined, is a viable logical alternative. It must be based on the 
Directive Principles of State Policy while holding the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by the Constitution as being 
sacrosanct and inalienable, so that politicians do not convert liberty into license or hijack democracy for personal 
gain. In addition, the paper argues that there must be good governance at the national and state levels where 
accountability and empowerment go hand in hand. If not, the candidate with money power, the candidate with 
muscle power, and the candidate with intellect power will behave like the proverbial two wolves and a sheep 
discussing what is to be had for dinner. It is here that this author rests his case. 
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